Zimbabwe will be holding presidential and parliamentary elections probably in March 2008. The ruling party’s record is appalling: the country has the highest inflation rate in the world, its life expectancy rates have dropped dramatically (currently around thirty-four compared to about 65 ten years ago), an estimated one-third of the population needs food aid, about twenty-five percent of the population now lives in other countries, chiefly South Africa and the UK, basic government services have collapsed, there are no jobs, and agricultural production has dropped precipitously.

In a democratic society, it would be safe to predict that the voters would remove the ruling party and bring to power the opposition. At the very least, one would expect the ruling party to put forward a new presidential candidate. In Zimbabwe, however, it seems safe to predict that ZANU PF will win the parliamentary elections and President Mugabe will be re-elected. Mugabe appears in control of the electoral process, both the competition within ZANU PF for president and the substantially less threatening competition between ZANU PF and the MDC.

I focus on how President Mugabe is preparing the groundwork for victory in his own party and in the inter-party competition with the MDC and the opposition civics. The emphasis is on recent constitutional changes and the introduction of new patronage resources that strengthen President Mugabe and ZANU PF. The ongoing SADC-mandated mediation by President Mbeki between the ruling party and the MDC has so far driven a deeper wedge between the MDC and the civics and has not provided any protection to the opposition from police brutality and police disruption of attempts to hold meetings or peaceful protests.

Even if the negotiations in South Africa produce significant democratizing legal changes, it is inconceivable that the political culture of violence and patronage that has supported 27 years of rule under ZANU PF and Mugabe can be changed between now and a March 2008 election. Even if the party can limit its use of violence, the MDC is probably too weak and divided to make much of a dent in the support that ZANU PF can mobilize.

ZANU PF internal politics

The ruling party is seriously internally divided. The overwhelming divisive issue is over who will succeed President Mugabe and when that succession should take place. According to the current constitution, President Mugabe’s six-year term of office will expire on 31 March 2008. Under the Electoral Act, the election to fill the vacancy must be held during the 90-day period before that date.

There is behind-the-scenes intrigue as the different factions vie with each other for advantage. The factions most frequently in the news belong to Rural Housing Minister, Emmerson Mnangagwa, and former national army commander, Solomon Mujuru, whose wife is nation’s vice-president and one of two party vice-presidents. The Mnangagwa faction is Karanga-affiliated; the Mujuru faction is Zezuru, as are President Mugabe and the leadership of police and army and many key posts. Apart from these factions, Simba Makoni and Defence Minister Sydney Sekeramayi, both Manyikas, are frequently cited as presidential contenders. But the Mugabe group appears to be prevailing, if only because Mugabe is the ultimate patron and still controls the means of violence.

Mugabe’s desire to extend his presidential term was challenged at the annual party conference in December 2006. Mugabe wanted to get party support for harmonizing the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2010. This would have required postponing presidential elections, due to be held by 31 March 2008, until the next parliamentary election must be held in 2010. The securocrat hierarchy, which supports Mugabe and which has growing political power, advised him to withdraw his proposal because of lack of support. In particular, the Mnangagwa and Mujuru factions were united in their opposition to another two years of a Mugabe presidency. Mugabe’s proposal for harmonizing the elections in 2010 was therefore not voted on.[1]

The divisiveness over the ZANU PF presidential candidate persisted at the March 30 2007 Central Committee meeting. Evidently the ZANU PF political commissar and Mugabe loyalist, Elliot Manyika, announced that Mugabe “was the only candidate, and there was no one else.”[2] The non-vote on Mugabe’s candidacy was a face-saving measure, given that there again appeared to be lack of support for Mugabe as the party’s presidential candidate. Mugabe, Mnangagwa, and Chinamasa, rather than the Central Committee itself, reportedly decided to harmonize presidential and parliamentary elections in March 2008.[3]

In addition, the central committee agreed to change the method of election of a new President where the incumbent resigns or dies in office; to change the method of election of senators; and to increase the numbers of members in the house and senate and to alter their composition.[4] These proposals which were approved by the central committee were designed to favor ZANU PF in the upcoming elections (see inter-party competition).

The “nomination” of the ZANU PF presidential candidate needs to be endorsed by the party’s extraordinary congress which will be held in December 2007.[5] On 5 September 2007, the politburo agreed that the party would vote on its presidium at the extraordinary party congress. Media reports suggest that by making the vice-presidents contest their party posts, at least the Mujuru faction will have to fight to retain the vice-presidency and will be deflected from focusing on securing the party presidency.[6] Thus, Mugabe is expected to benefit in his bid for party president and sole candidate for the 2008 presidential election.  

In other ways, too, Mugabe is orchestrating a campaign to ensure his nomination as presidential candidate at the December 2007 congress and a ZANU PF win in the parliamentary and local government elections. Almost all institutions are divided by the succession conflict but Mugabe still does control the purse strings. He gives priority to retaining the support of the army and the police, the youth militia and the war veterans, chiefs, and the Youth and Women’s Leagues.  

He is using a section of the war veterans to hold marches in the major cities of the country to demonstrate support for his candidacy and to intimidate other aspirant candidates. Jay Sibanda, the former war veterans’ association chair until he was suspended from the party and his post because of his role in the Tsholotsho meeting in November 2004, has apparently held marches with Mugabe’s sanction. The marches started on August 31 in Harare, then in Bulawayo, Gwanda, and Gweru on October 12, 13, and 14 respectively, Marondera on October 19 and Bindura on October 20. The police, who harass the opposition even when they have permission to hold rallies, have marched alongside the veterans.  

Sibanda has threatened those within ZANU PF who demonstrate lack of support for Mugabe. He turned on the ZANU PF Bulawayo leaders after they refused to allow him to use the party headquarters, and was reported as saying: “We want to remove ZANU PF officials who are known for peddling tribal wars. Let me assure you that the war veterans are going to demonstrate against the tribalists.” He said Mugabe was “a man of wisdom surrounded by corrupt ministers”, who were destroying the economy, and promised action the ministers. John Nkomo, national party chair, Dumiso Dabengwa, and Vice President Msika reportedly will raise the role of Sibanda in the politburo meeting due to occur on October 24.

Home Affairs Minister Kenneth Mohadi, Environment and Tourism Minister Andrew Langa, and Deputy Minister of Public Service, Labor, and Social Welfare Abedinico Bhebhe attended the veterans’ march in Gwanda.[7][8] Sibanda also referred to “internal reactionary forces within our party” and said: “Those who claim to be ZANU PF but refuse to endorse President Mugabe are sellouts.”[9]  

The state media maintain that Mugabe’s candidacy has been endorsed not only by the war veterans but also by the Women’s League and the Youth League. The Women’s League is led by long-time Mugabe loyalist, Oppah Muchinguri, who may herself be a candidate against Joice Mujuru for vice-president. Her apparent reference to those elected to champion the interests of women having failed them was thought to be directed at Joice Mujuru. The Youth League, when it allegedly endorsed Mugabe’s candidacy, was led by Savior Kasukuwere and Patrick Zhuwayo, Mugabe’s nephew, but they have since been removed as “too old”.[10]  

A major boost to Mugabe’s candidacy is the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Bill, which Minister Paul Mangwana described as a continuation of the quest for economic liberation begun with the land reform program.[11] The bill, which was passed by the house with minor amendments and then by the senate on September 26 and October 2 2007 respectively, will create substantial patronage resources to entice the elite to stay within the Mugabe camp. The bill aims to ensure that indigenous (black) Zimbabweans ultimately will be given at least a 51 percent shareholding in every public company and any other businesses. Indigenous businesses will benefit from mandatory procurement requirements. The responsible Minister has enormous discretionary powers in terms of the bill.

For instance, he can impose levies on specific companies and businesses to help finance indigenization and criminalize the failure to comply. Foreign banks and foreign mining companies – Barclays, Standard, Rio Tinto, Anglo American, BP, Shell, BAT - seem to be targets.  

Inter-party competition  

ZANU PF faces an MDC that is even weaker than it was in the March 2005 general election and November 2005 senate election. The MDC is weak in part because its hierarchy and supporters have been victims of ZANU PF violence and repression and CIO infiltration. But the MDC has weaknesses of its own making. It split into two factions in October 2005. The smaller and now funding-starved Mutambara-faction has its electoral strength in Matabeleland; the larger Tsvangirai-faction, which has its base chiefly in Harare but also other towns outside Matabeleland. The two factions have been unable to form a united front for the upcoming elections.  

After the high-profile extreme police brutality against the opposition on March 11 2007, the two factions agreed in April to form an electoral coalition against ZANU PF. The factions recognized each other’s independence and equality and committed to work toward reunification. But the Tsvangirai faction sought to make changes to the agreement on 19 May, leading to the Mutambara faction’s withdrawal from the coalition. At the same time, the Mutambara faction also withdrew from the Save Zimbabwe Campaign, an opposition umbrella group including NGOs and churches, after it sided with the Tvangirai-faction.[12]

The Tsvangirai faction continues to implode. Its leadership focuses on competing for electoral spoils, as defeat of ZANU PF seems increasingly remote. The recent report of the unconstitutional removal of the leader of the Women’s League, Lucy Matibenga,[13] is an example of how the Tsvangirai faction continues to be plagued by internal competition for positions and a lack of internal democracy.[14] Reports of the Tsvangirai faction’s failure to adhere to its own constitution deny it the moral high ground against ZANU PF, while bickering over positions undermines developing a strategy to defeat ZANU PF.  

The MDC factions are also weakened by their growing rift with opposition civic organizations. The civics, already disenchanted with their exclusion from the negotiations in South Africa, denounced the MDC factions for their unanimous support of the revised version of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 18) Bill in the house and senate on September 18 2007 and September 26 2007 respectively. These constitutional amendments have their origins in the central committee proposals approved in March 2007. Both MDC factions had criticized the ZANU PF central committee’s proposal to make parliament, rather than the electorate, responsible for choosing a successor should the president die or become ill or incapacitated in office.

Both factions had also rejected any further piecemeal constitutional amendments and supported the creation of a new constitution – the stance of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign, of which the Tsvangirai faction is still a member. Finally, both groups had publicly opposed the creation of a government-appointed human rights body, yet their support for the bill meant consenting to the formation of a Human Rights Commission whose members will be presidential appointees.  

The expanded number of house and senate seats provided for in the constitutional amendments will provide new patronage sources for ZANU PF that will be useful not only in intra-ZANU PF battles but also in competition with the MDC. While the MDC prevailed in removing the twenty percent of seats which ZANU PF could count on before an election even began – these seats went to chiefs, non-constituency presidential appointees, and provincial governors who are presidential appointees - it is ZANU PF who will likely benefit from the 60 new house seats and the election of all house members. Moreover, the provincial governors who lost guaranteed house seats are now guaranteed senate seats, and to make up for the loss of house seats for chiefs, they are accorded more senate seats than previously – up from ten to eighteen.

The 10 new elected senate seats are also likely to be additional patronage resources for ZANU PF. So, the 33 new senate seats will also most likely advantage ZANU PF.  

Additionally, the new house and senate seats will require the delimitation of new constituencies, which has historically been used by ZANU PF for gerrymandering. The MDC won a victory in removing the power of the Registrar General and the Delimitation Commission in this exercise. However, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, which acquires the power of delimitation, will be no better than the Delimitation Commission unless its composition is changed from being a ZANU PF body.  

SADC-mandated talks  

The SADC-mandated talks between ZANU PF and the MDC factions, who function as a team, began in April 2007. After the highly publicized police brutality against the opposition on March 11, SADC had to be seen to be intervening. The talks, mediated by President Mbeki, are supposed to result in the creation of a new constitution; the reform of security, communication, and electoral laws; and a change in the political climate. The MDC, despite its political weakness, is a necessary negotiating partner to legitimate the talks. Mbeki’s goal is to have undisputed free and fair elections in Zimbabwe. He has a track record of partisanship toward Mugabe and ZANU PF and of low regard for the MDC.[15]

The relative power of ZANU PF is demonstrated by the origin and passage of the eighteenth constitutional amendment bill. This bill began in ZANU PF with central committee approved proposals in March 2007, one day after the end of the SADC emergency summit to discuss the situation in Zimbabwe. It then became part of the constitutional talks in South Africa. Though some MDC modifications found their way into the text, the real beneficiary is ZANU PF. Mediation helped to legitimate a predominantly ZANU PF agenda – ZANU PF, SADC, and Mbeki can say the provisions were agreed to by the MDC. Yet the MDC had little choice but to agree to the amendment and hope that Mbeki will deliver the other hoped for changes.  

On October 15 2007, Tsvangirai, speaking from Philadelphia, threatened to pull his faction out of talks unless ZANU PF violence and intimidation stops. He also submitted a letter of complaint to SADC about the increase in violence against the opposition. According to his faction, police have prevented 103 of their rallies from taking place since the start of negotiations. [16] The MDC claims thousands of rights abuses in the first six months of 2007. [17] Tsvangirai also told his supporters at a rally in October that the MDC would not participate in the election unless the playing field is level.[18] Should the MDC carry out these threats, it will lose any opportunity to influence the electoral environment and participate in parliament.

Given the relative power of ZANU PF, it is not going to introduce constitutional and legal changes that in anyway reduce its prospects of an electoral victory. Mugabe and Chinamasa, one of the two ZANU PF negotiators, gave precisely those reassurances to the politburo in September 2007.[19] Even should the talks produce a new and improved constitution and reformed laws that make for a level playing field – and it is a big if - ZANU PF continues to monopolize the power of patronage and the instruments of violence.  

Conclusion  

It is difficult to see how Mugabe and ZANU PF can lose even a ‘free and fair’ election. The rural population is tightly controlled by chiefs, who are well-rewarded by ZANU PF. Food shortages are severe, and ZANU PF will distribute any food aid through chiefs only in exchange for guaranteed votes. Veterans had their pensions increased in June;[20] they will likely be given other payments to induce them to campaign for Mugabe and the party. The police and the military have had salary increases this year; if the past is any guide, they will receive further increases just before the election.

Land held by the state can be reallocated to both punish and reward. There are parliamentary seats and shares in companies waiting to be allocated to Mugabe loyalists. If patronage is not enough, there are the militias, the veterans, the army, and the police. ZANU PF has never used violence proportional to the threat; perhaps the best one might hope for is that it perceives the opposition for what it is: a non-threat. 

[1] Check Africa Confidential

[2] International Crisis Group, Zimbabwe: A Regional Solution?  Crisis Group Africa Report No.132, 18 September 2007, p.4.

[3]  Dumisani Muleya, Mugabe re-election becomes ‘almost certain’, Business Day (SA), 19 September 2007.  The harmonization of presidential and parliamentary elections would mean that parliamentary candidates will have to hitch their fortunes to the presidential candidate and campaign for him.

[4] For the proposals and their constitutional and legal implications, see Veritas, Bill Watch, No. 14, 9 April 2007.   According to Veritas, press reports on the decisions reached at the central committee meeting “are not entirely clear or consistent”. 

[5] According to International Crisis Group, Zimbabwe: A Regional Solution?  Crisis Group Africa Report No.132, 18 September 2007, footnote 41, p.5: “A congress is normally held to select the party leadership only every five years but it has been advanced by two years.  Participation is somewhat wider than at a conference, including not only members of the politburo and central committee and representatives of the provinces, but also delegates from the branches, the smallest party structure.”

[6] Clemence Manyukwe, Will Mujuru survive?...as presidium race is thrown open, Financial Gazette, 11 October 2007.  

[8] Crisis Coalition Alert, 17 October 2007; Mugabe sanctioned war vets’ marches, Zim Online (SA), 20 October 2007;  Constantine Chimakure/Loughty Dube, Fury as Sibanda bounces back, Zimbabwe Independent, 19 October 2007; Kholwani Nathi, War vets target Msika, Nkomo, The Standard, 14 October 2007; Walter Marwizi, Defiant Sibanda cocks snook at top chefs, The Standard, 14 October 2007; Norman Chitapi, President undermined by ZANU PF divisions, Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 19 September 2007.

[9] Will Mujuru survive?... as presidium race is thrown wide open, Clemence Manyukwe, Financial Gazette, 11 October 2007.

[10] Norman Chitapi, President undermined by ZANU PF divisions, Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 19 September 2007; Will Mujuru survive?... as presidium race is thrown wide open, Clemence Manyukwe, Financial Gazette, 11 October 2007.

[11] Indigenisation bill sails through, The Herald (Harare), 3 October 2007.  http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200710030781.html

[12] For details on the collapse of the coalition agreement, see International Crisis Group, Zimbabwe: A Regional Solution?  Crisis Group Africa Report No.132, 18 September 2007, pp.11-12.

[14] Brian Raftopoulos, Reflections on Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe: The Politics of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in Brian Ratopolous and Karin Alexander (eds.), Reflections on Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe  (Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2006), 6-28.

[15] To take one example, Mbeki prejudged the 2005 election would be free and fair, saying that “things like access to the public media, things like violence-free election have been addressed.   See Lauren Ploch, Zimbabwe: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, updated 21 June 2007, p.38.

[16] Blessing Zulu, Tsvangirai threatens to exit Zimbabwe crisis talks if violence continues, VOA News, 15 October 2007.

[17] Njabulo Ncube, MDC’s Mbeki talks shocker, Financial Gazette, 18 October 2007.

[18] Njabulo Ncube, SA piles pressure on Zanu Pf, Financial Gazette, 4 October 2007.

[19] Mugabe trying to fob MDC off with minor reforms, Business Day (SA), 18 September 2007.

[20] Huge increase in war vets pension, SW Radio, 25 June 2007.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer(s) and not do necessarily reflect the views of the AfricaFiles' editors and network members. They are included in our material as a reflection of a diversity of views and a variety of issues. Material written specifically for AfricaFiles may be edited for length, clarity or inaccuracies.

     top of page