Introduction

From independence, there were many who were skeptical that the new country of Nigeria could last. How could such an amalgam of three large territories with three major ethnic groups, conflicting religions, and distinct histories stay together as one state? The five decades since then have witnessed much struggle, outbreaks of violence, and little real prosperity—despite tremendous oil wealth. Would the situation be any better if there were a division into two or even three smaller states where there is now one larger one whose presidency must alternate between a Northerner and a Southerner? Or would things be worse?

Interestingly, both Nigerian and external actors started expressing concerns about the survival of Nigeria as one indivisible, united country as early as 1914. This was a sequel to the amalgamation of the largely autonomous Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and Protectorate of Northern Nigeria by the British colonial authorities. The feasibility of a united Nigeria was ab initio a cause for concern because of the top-down, non-participatory process of amalgamation. Since the decision to amalgamate hinged on the fiscal expediency of averting a subvention to the administration of the Northern Protectorate by British tax payers, amalgamation was consummated through administrative fiat rather than consultations and negotiations with and among the colonized peoples. Consequently, as is common with victims of forced marriages, the parties coupled as Nigeria only had the option of checking their compatibility and complementarity while in cohabitation. Consent was given after marriage in the various constitutional conferences convened by the British colonial authorities cum "marriage counsellors" to address the crises of forced marriage.

As is common with victims of forced marriages, the parties coupled as Nigeria only had the option of checking their compatibility and complementarity while in cohabitation... Federalism became the emergent consensus arrangement for continued cohabitation.

The constitutional conferences were inadvertently empowering to the Nigeria marriage partners. The debates and negotiations during such conferences rejuvenated and reinvigorated the partners. The partners easily began to conceptualize their relationship as courtship when the prospects for independence brightened in the context of post-Second World War United States foreign policy support for decolonization. The constitutional conferences offered the partners the opportunities either to opt out of the relationship or to give conditions for continued cohabitation. Federalism became the emergent consensus arrangement for continued cohabitation as it was considered the best political institution to address the perennial assertive nationalism and fears of domination haunting the marriage.

As the Union Jack was replaced by the Nigerian flag on 1 October 1960, to signify independence, the euphoria of Nigerians was not so much born out of a celebration of wedlock as of a decision to experiment with a marriage of convenience. This is because addressing assertive nationalism and fears of domination was a work in progress.

The challenge of disunity and inequality

Central to the discussions at the constitutional conferences was how to deal with disunity and inequality. Disunity, to a large extent, was the product of differential incorporation—the piecemeal fashion of colonization. The colonial construction of Nigeria occurred through random encounters with the disparate groups co-existing in the geographical space allotted to the British government at the 1884 Berlin Conference. Whether annexed through conquest or consent, most of the groups entered into a covenant with the colonizing power. A fundamental clause of the agreement, euphemistically referred to as a "Treaty of Protection", was the undertaking of the colonizing power to preserve the autonomy of the colonized and protect them from external aggression. Since the Berlin Conference had mitigated conflicts over spheres of influence among European powers, external aggression practically implied aggression from neighboring and proximate groups. The promise to protect colonized peoples from each other inevitably bred mutual suspicion and mistrust.

Since constituency delimitation and representation hinged on cultural differentiation, the colonial state created conditions salubrious for ethnogenesis and the politicization of ethnicity.

Such suspicion and mistrust among the colonized communities was aggravated by the policy of indirect rule. This policy, which was born out of administrative expediency, contributed to the politicization of difference. Since constituency delimitation and representation hinged on cultural differentiation, the colonial state created conditions salubrious for ethnogenesis and the politicization of ethnicity. The colonial state was therefore an historical enigma as it wittingly or unwittingly embarked upon nation-state building by incentivizing assertive micro-nationalism among the constituent units of the proto-nation-state.

The challenges of unity and equality became more pronounced following the partitioning of the amalgamated state into three regions. This is because regionalization contributed to the emergence of major and minority ethnic groups. The major ethnic groups (Hausa cum Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba) are groups that dominated the regional governments while the minorities are other ethnic groups that opposed the dominance of the major ethnic group in their region. Regionalization provided the incentive for political elites to establish parties overtly aimed at mobilizing ethnic votes and purporting to support ethnic or ethno-regional interests. The electoral successes of parties with overt ethnic and regional agendas led to the eclipse of fledging national and pan-Africanist parties. The three parties that controlled the governments of the regions emerged as the dominant parties which competed for supremacy in the central government.

Independence

Against the backdrop of the jostling for so-called ethnic and regional interests, it is not surprising that it was challenging to forge national consensus on any issue. For instance, even the advocacy for independence, which should have been a rallying point for unity, was divisive as party positions were jaundiced by ethnic and regional interests. The northern parliamentarians elected under the platform of the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) opposed the motion for independence sponsored by southern parliamentarians of the Action Group (AG) and National Council for Nigeria and Cameroun (NCNC) in 1953. The NPC wanted the motion for "independence in 1956" to be amended to "independence as soon as practicable." The northern parliamentarians' preference for a later date for independence was based on the imperative of the north bridging the inequality gaps with the south before independence. As Mallam Ahmadu Bello, Sarduana of Sokoto and Leader of the NPC, opined in the parliamentary debate on the motion for independence:

We in the North are working very hard towards self-government although we were late in assimilating Western education, yet within a short time we will catch up with the other Regions and share their lot. We have embarked upon so many plans of reform and development that we must have time to see how this works in practice. We want to be realistic and consolidate our gains (Sklar 2004, 128ff).

In response to allegations by some southern parliamentarians that NPC leaders had connived with British officials to perpetuate colonial rule, Bello said: "the mistake of 1914 has come to light and I should like to go no further." The regret expressed regarding Nigerian unity by the NPC leader was followed up by the adoption of an eight point program by the NPC which if implemented, according to Coleman (1958), would have led to "the virtual secession of the Northern region from Nigeria." The independence date palaver culminated in riots in Kano which claimed 36 lives, mostly southerners living in this northern city.

Although leading southern politicians that championed an early date for independence emphasized nationalist and pan-Africanist motivations, their credentials as nationalists had been tainted by their antecedents. Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who described Nigeria "as a mere geographical expression," had established the AG to checkmate the NCNC whose leader, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, had openly expressed the belief that his Igbo ethnic group had the manifest destiny to lead Africa. Moreover, it was evident that a political context, where the Northern Region was larger than the two southern regions put together, provided incentives for southern political parties to develop a national orientation. The national outlook of the AG and NCNC was necessitated by the fact that winning votes outside their spheres of influence was critical to their success. The NPC for its part stood to benefit from a regionalist outlook because it could win a majority of seats in the central legislature by winning a majority of seats in its own domain.

Military intervention and civil war

The challenge of addressing disunity and horizontal inequalities was not helped by the class character of the emergent political elite. Without a strong economic base, most of the aspirant political elites instrumentalized political power for private accumulation. The result was that politics became a zero-sum game in which the end justified the means. It is therefore not surprising that the political elites manipulated and mobilized ethnic and religious identities for political purposes. The extant inequalities between North and South and between the major ethnic groups and minorities in the regions were harnessed by politicians to mobilize sympathetic captive communities. In these circumstances, the fortunes of ethnic groups became inextricably linked to the fortunes of the political parties they were associated with. In practical terms this meant that an ethnic group floated or sunk with the political party it was deemed to have supported. Ruling parties used political power to reward loyal and friendly ethnic communities and to punish and deprive unfriendly ethnic communities.

The challenge of addressing disunity and horizontal inequalities was not helped by the class character of the emergent political elite... The extant inequalities ... were harnessed by politicians to mobilize sympathetic captive communities.

This became the norm at the attainment of flag independence, as the departure of the British colonial administrators eroded all semblance of state neutrality. The state and its apparatuses became indiscreetly enmeshed in class and ethnic conflicts. In the emerging scenario, which Nigerian political economist Claude Ake aptly described as "political anxiety" (Ake 1996), the post-colonial Nigerian state could not conduct any credible election and population census. Political alliances were very fluid due to shifting interests. Ethnic arithmetic coloured virtually all major public policies such as budgets, infrastructural development, etc. For instance, although minorities in all regions had been agitating for the creation of states since 1952, the NPC-NCNC coalition government only acceded to the agitation of minorities in the Western Region, which was controlled by the opposition AG. 

The country drifted from one political crisis to another, culminating in a military coup on 15 January 1966. Although most Nigerians welcomed the coup as a relief from the corrupt and divisive political class, the legitimacy of the first military regime was rapidly corroded by its ethnic bias. While it was able to crush a feeble secessionist rebellion in the Niger Delta area of the Eastern Region, the regime could not survive the insurrection from civil society that greeted its controversial unification policy. The intent of the policy was the transformation of Nigeria from a federal to a unitary state. Given the atmosphere of pervasive ethnic suspicion, the policy was ill-advised. Granted that federalism was divisive in practice, it moderated the winner-takes-all logic of politics as it allowed a sphere of influence to the major political stakeholders. The unification policy appeared to reverse the gains of Nigeria's marriage partners who, driven by fear of domination, desired a balance of powers between the central and regional governments. It was particularly anathema to the northern political class and intelligentsia who sponsored a counter-coup that toppled the Igbo-centric regime and fanned the embers of hatred and recrimination that led to the killing of Eastern Nigerian (mostly Igbo) civilian residents in some Northern Nigerian towns.

Challenges to the authority of the second military regime and angst over the killings of thousands of Igbo civilians in the North led to the declaration of the Republic of Biafra by the Eastern Region government. The secessionist attempt was crushed after three years of bloody civil war.

Post-civil war responses to disunity and inequality: Producing the president

Central to the end of the Biafran secession was the creation of twelve states on the eve of the commencement of the civil war. Deprived of its coastal sections, which had been carved into two states that satisfied the longstanding aspirations of eastern minorities, the Biafran territory lacked access to supplies and lost expected revenue from oil and gas. The creation of states not only contributed to the defeat of Biafran secession but also to the stabilization of the federation. This is because the decomposition of the all-powerful regions into relatively Lilliputian states indirectly strengthened the federal centre. It created a situation where no state had the resources to challenge the authority of the federal government. Federal power was also fortified by the rising boom in the sale of crude oil that made the states fiscally dependent on, and ipso facto subservient to, the federal government.

Oil wealth enabled the federal government to implement several policies aimed at promoting unity and reducing inequality. The government initiated the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) program where graduates from tertiary institutions were sponsored to serve the country for a one-year period outside their state of origin. Government sought to transfer allegiance from religious and communal groups to the state by taking over all schools and hospitals established by religious and communal organizations. The federal government took over universities established by regional governments and established new universities to meet its one state one university policy. The objective of the establishment of universities and ancillary admission policies was to improve access to education to all sections of the country, especially among the so-called educationally less advantaged states. The federal government also subsidized petroleum products to ensure that the pump price of petroleum products were not variable across the country. Many of the redistributive policies aimed at reducing horizontal inequalities were also expected to promote unity by giving all groups a sense of belonging. A "federal character principle" was also enshrined in the constitution to ensure that all constituent states or local councils are represented in the federal or state executive councils.

Many of the redistributive policies aimed at reducing horizontal inequalities were also expected to promote unity... However, some of the policies have generated several unintended consequences... (including) another vicious form of communalism at the state level.

On balance, post-civil war national integration policies have been largely successful. This is especially the case if the yardstick for evaluation is the termination of secessionist conflicts. The country has not experienced any secessionist conflict since the end of the civil war. However, some of the policies have generated several unintended consequences. For instance, while the "federal character principle" has promoted a fairer distribution of political offices, it has engendered another vicious form of communalism at the state level. Many parts of the country, notably Plateau State, are rocked by bloody conflicts arising from exclusion of so-called non-indigenes. Moreover, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of the integrationist and redistributive politics and policies. A fundamental limitation is the inherent incapacity of such policies to affect civil society and market dynamics. The latter forces, which are driven by a different logic, have made the dreams of disadvantaged groups catching up a mirage. Market forces are naturally motivated by profit rather than equity. The ideology of progress that inspires civil society entails that each group continues to strive for improvement but has no incentive to wait for others, especially competing groups, to catch up.

Finally, post-civil war policies to strengthen the federation have dialectically sown the seeds for perennial instability and crises in the federation. Like Thomas Hobbes, who was afraid of insecurity, the architects of post-civil war Nigeria created a virtual omnipotent presidency to guarantee the security of the federation. Not surprisingly, the Nigerian Leviathan generates insecurity rather than security among Nigeria's disparate civil society. Fear derives largely from the incapacity of Nigerians to control what a clairvoyant presidential adviser aptly called the "imperial presidency" (Maduekwe 2003). Incapacity to control the leviathan engenders an endless striving to produce the leviathan from among competing groups. Filial bonding with the leviathan has a therapeutic effect on fear.

Post-civil war policies to strengthen the federation have dialectically sown the seeds for perennial instability and crises in the federation ... an endless striving to produce the leviathan from among competing groups.

In lieu of a conclusion: united we stand, divided we fall

My argument is that many of the crises and conflicts that have debilitated the Nigerian state since the early 1990s, as economic crises and corruption undermined the gains of redistributive integrative policies, are either directly or indirectly linked to the struggle to be president or to "produce" the president and to the fear that this struggle generates. The annulment of the 12 June 1993 elections triggered almost a decade's long political crisis that was only resolved by the decision of the dominant political class to allow the Yoruba to "produce" the president. The Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) adopted a secessionist rhetoric. However, it failed to mobilize the type of support that the Odua Peoples' Congress (OPC) earned among the Yoruba because what the Igbo people wanted was the actualization of an Igbo presidency, not secession. In any case, advocacy for an Igbo presidency was farfetched as power had to shift back to the North having stayed in the South for eight years. Meanwhile, the Niger Delta militancy over resource control was inspired by the desire of the people of the region to ultimately produce the president of the country. Not a few Niger Deltans believe that the expropriation of oil and gas from their land to "develop other regions," is symptomatic of their not having produced the president. No small wonder then that the unexpected emergence of a "Niger Delta" president (Goodluck Jonathan) as well as the implementation of an amnesty program for the Niger Delta have had a sedative effect on militancy. Again, as devastating as the attacks were on oil installations (the lifeblood of the Nigerian state), the militants were not seeking secession from the central state. Even the suicidal Boko Haram sect, the current headache of the Nigerian state, is not seeking dissolution of the Nigerian state. Their attacks on state agencies and destabilization campaigns are rather driven by their sense of alienation and hopelessness regarding Nigeria's version of modernity and democracy (see Mustapha 2009). The demand for rule under a theocratic Sharia state really implies a desire to produce the president. The sect has clearly harnessed widespread discontent in the North, evidenced by post-election violence in April 2011, over the return of power to the South after the short-lived Yar'Adua presidency.

Attacks on state agencies and destabilization campaigns are driven by their sense of alienation and hopelessness... What Nigerians seek is a government that is responsive and accountable.

All told, the division of Nigeria is not yet on the agenda. What Nigerians seek is a government that is responsive and accountable. Remaking the presidency and the devolution of powers and resources to the people would likely contribute to good governance.

References

Ake, C. 1996. "The Political Question." In Governance and Development in Nigeria: Essays in Honour of Professor Billy J. Dudley, edited by O. Oyediran, 22–32. Ibadan: Oyediran Consults International.

Coleman, J. 1958. Nigeria: Background to Nationalism. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Maduekwe, O. 2003. "Keynote address." In Governance and Politics at the Local Level: Proceedings of CASS Policy Dialogue No. 1, edited by L. A. Jinadu and C. Omelle. Port Harcourt: CASS Publications.

Mustapha, A. R. 2009. "Caught between Boko Haram and 'Governance Haram.'" The Guardian, August 8.

Sklar, R. 2004. Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent Nation. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.

In January 2011, over 98 percent of Sudanese in South Sudan and in the diaspora voted in favour of secession from Sudan. Six months later, the media were filled with images of joyous celebrations from around the world that marked the birth of world's newest country, the Republic of South Sudan. It was an historic moment with powerfully moving scenes of people hugging each other and jubilation in the streets of Juba, capital city of the new republic. After decades of a brutal civil war that left millions of people dead and millions more displaced, this was truly an occasion for rejoicing. For many South Sudanese (and indeed for many Africans as well), South Sudan represents a golden opportunity: a blank slate, a chance to "get it right" by learning from the myriad of post-independence mistakes made by other African countries.

Building the Republic of South Sudan (also referred to as RoSS or RSS) will require significant resources and hard work. Imagine for a moment everything that currently exists in established, functioning societies in the 21st century: from village markets to merchant banks, from rural clinics to specialized hospital complexes, from nursery schools to universities, and the list goes on. Today's societies depend on structures that require ever more skills. Every type of labour and entrepreneurship imaginable is needed in order for them to thrive: teachers, doctors, engineers, manufacturers, agriculturalists, plumbers, electricians, lawyers, nurses, judges, and civil service technocrats, to name only a few. South Sudanese themselves will need to determine what the priority issues are, and play an active role in addressing them if all are to benefit from the hard-won dividends of peace and sovereignty.

History has many lessons to offer the people of South Sudan and its leaders, and much can be done now to set South Sudan on the path toward creating a just, peaceful, democratic, economically viable and self-sustaining country that could be a beacon of hope and an example to Africa and the world. But six years after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the two Sudans are still embroiled in conflict, wrestling over issues of border demarcation and the sharing of oil revenues. This article will point out a few of the possibilities and dangers ahead for the new country of South Sudan. It will look at the evolving relationship between the "new" and the "old" Sudan—including border issues and whether or not the new entity will be economically viable.

Questions of governance

The current transitional government has to secure and allocate the resources required to meet the demands of a restive society that has endured huge suffering and that now seeks to enjoy the fruits of peace and build a sustainable and successful nation state. The international community has pledged support for the development of the Republic of South Sudan. Similar past promises fell far short of expectations, however, including several made after the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (or CPA) that ended the 21-year civil war between north and south Sudan. Will the international community now live up to pledges it has made to this new member state? With what conditions will the RSS have to comply, and at what price? Might the price of development assistance from donor states mean only nominal sovereignty for the Republic of South Sudan? What processes must be put in place immediately in order to ensure that decisions made in these early days are genuinely arrived at in the best interests of the South Sudanese themselves? How can they involve all sectors of RSS civil society—particularly women—in all areas of decision-making, and be sustainable and equitable for the longer term?

The South Sudanese government needs to tap into the potential and the indomitable sense of purpose within the civil society of South Sudan and the diaspora for the task of nation-building. A diverse range of voices representing the different sectors of society should have input into determining the content of a governing Constitution for South Sudan. However, there are concerns about how effectively and equitably or democratically this will be done. At Independence, Salva Kiir Mayardit of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) became the first elected president of South Sudan. There is a strong historical link between the SPLM and the Dinka people of South Sudan. Of course, this raises questions regarding the SPLM's capacity to govern such a diverse society as South Sudan, which has over 60 ethnic groups (Verjee 2010, 23). Lessons can be learned from conflicts experienced in neighbouring countries like Kenya. Even as an interim document, the current Transitional Constitution of South Sudan must address the powers and limitations of government, the roles and responsibilities of other governance institutions, and the rights and obligations of citizens regardless of ethnicity. Representation at all levels of governance and in state institutions must take into account the ethnic diversity of South Sudan, even as the country works to firmly establish a rights-based culture to eradicate the dangerous divisiveness that results from a focus on ethnicity. Cattle-grazing on other people's land and land-grabbing are major sources of conflict among communities. Lessons from Sudan's history demonstrate that unequal access to resources, marginalization, and neglect are often at the root of so-called ethnic conflicts.

Representation at all levels of governance and in state institutions must take into account the ethnic diversity of South Sudan.... Lessons from Sudan's history demonstrate that unequal access to resources, marginalization, and neglect are often at the root of so-called ethnic conflicts.

Infrastructure, oil and security

Development of socio-economic infrastructure should be a top priority for South Sudan. The provision of social services in a country the size of South Sudan requires large capital investments. From all indications, South Sudan will rely on oil revenues to underwrite much of its economic development. The sharing of oil revenues between South Sudan and Sudan continues to be contentious. In November 2011, the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) hosted delegates from the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan in Addis Ababa. This was a resumption of negotiations on post-Referendum issues including border demarcation, transitional financial arrangements, oil, trade, and assets and liabilities. It is evident from a press release issued by the South Sudanese delegation on November 30th that these issues are far from being resolved. Among other things, the RSS offered:

• $2.6 billion over a period of four years to the Government of Sudan (GoS) in the north, as part of transitional financial arrangements;
• forgiveness of $2.8 of the $5.8 billion in arrears and outstanding debts that Sudan owes the RSS and its people;
• a wealth transfer to the north of $5.4 billion—70 percent of the International Monetary Fund calculated fiscal gap of Sudan of $7.7 billion. (The GoS apparently rejected this, stating that its fiscal gap is $10.4 billion, $3 billion of which it can cover itself, requiring the RSS to transfer $7.4 billion); and
• major concessions on its prior position regarding Abyei and North/South borders, beginning with financial transfer arrangements if "the SAF [Sudan Armed Forces] fully withdraws from Abyei and timebound processes are established to i) secure the final status resolutions on Abyei, ii) complete the demarcation of the defined borders of the area, and iii) settle the six disputed areas by arbitration" (African Union 2011).

At this time, armed conflicts continue to rage between the forces of the Sudan and South Sudan in Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile regions. Unless the border issues can be justly and peacefully resolved in the immediate future, progress on sustainable economic development in South Sudan remains precarious. This might work to the advantage of foreign oil companies who may try to justify high oil prices (and record profits) as the cost (and benefit) of doing business in "dangerous places" but it will do nothing to support development in South Sudan. The insecurity will make engaging in long-term sustainable economic development risky. 

Church and civil society

The Sudanese Christian churches, Catholic and Protestant, have been among the most dedicated institutions working for peace and justice in South Sudan. During the decades of civil war, the church accompanied those affected by the conflict, ministering to those who stayed behind, the internally displaced and refugees. Together with the All Africa Conference of Churches and the World Council of Churches, it worked tirelessly to bring the Khartoum government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement to the negotiating table. Now, the church is a key part of civil society's efforts to build the new nation from the ground up. The church, writ large, has arguably the largest grassroots network in South Sudan, connecting with every socio-economic sector of the community, and it has the opportunity to hear directly from the people about their hopes and concerns. This author had an opportunity to visit with the Sudan Council of Churches in Juba in March of 2011. Staff working for the Council spoke frankly about the colossal challenges ahead. I was privileged also to sit in on meetings with various communities, and heard first-hand from those I met about their hopes, dreams and fears. The unanimous sentiments expressed were hope for the future and anxiety about the vulnerability of their sovereignty and the very real possibility of a return to war with Sudan.

The unanimous sentiments expressed were hope for the future and anxiety about the vulnerability of their sovereignty.... Developing a representative and inclusive framework of decision-making processes ... is a key first step.

These are also the challenges and mixed feelings about the future with which South Sudanese civil society as a whole is wrestling. To succeed in nation-building, it is first of all clear that women's participation is essential at all levels and needs to be prioritized and effectively supported by the RSS government and the international community. Currently, gender-based violence and cultural barriers hinder women's effective participation as citizens and agents of change. Developing a representative and inclusive framework of decision-making processes based on just and equitable rules and laws is a key first step. Equally crucial is the building of societal structures based on respect for human rights, ethnic and religious diversity, and special needs. South Sudan civil society seems eager to roll up its collective sleeves and get to work. At a convention held on July 26-29, 2011 at the Nyakuron Cultural Centre in Juba, representatives of civil society groups from all ten states of South Sudan acknowledged themselves capable of contributing to the task of nation-building and social transformation. This event marked the birth of the South Sudan Civil Society Alliance, which declared:

[We] bestow upon ourselves the responsibility to facilitate the improvement of the lives of our people, kick start socio-economic development, promote democracy/good governance, raise issues of concern to the Government, promote the rule of law, peace, stability, development as well as to influence transitional processes in the country. (South Sudan Civil Society Alliance 2011)

Convention participants declared that they "look forward to a people-driven constitution making process, a sustainable democratization process, the consolidation of peace, community security and meaningful beginning of socio-economic development." It made important recommendations to citizens of South Sudan, civil society, government, donors and parties to the CPA. All of these people must work closely and constructively together to ensure that democracy and development become realities. 

Returning, rebuilding and the ethnic reality

South Sudan is not a completely blank slate. There is existing infrastructure on which to build. However, over two decades of war between the north and south destroyed much of what existed, so reconstruction and rehabilitation are urgently needed. More importantly, lives were destroyed, people were traumatized and many displaced from their homes and communities. In those two lost decades, the opportunities for many South Sudanese to develop their potentials were non-existent. While many became highly skilled and educated in a range of vital professions, particularly among the diaspora, many more were unable to complete their education and training. Some never had any opportunity for schooling. During my visit, I heard from young and old people alike that they are eager to access educational opportunities and training in technical skills. They lamented that all they have known is war, and that many have never had the opportunity to learn to read and write. They were now facing the daunting task of building their country without many of the basic skills. However, they expressed readiness to take up the challenge of engaging in the hard work ahead.

It would be dangerous ... to ignore or discount the role and impact of strong ethnic loyalties... the tribe offers acceptance, socio-economic safety and security, and a sense of belonging.

Where and how to begin? South Sudanese society, culture, history and politics are complex enough that it would be a mistake to think the answer is either obvious or simple. There are, however, many lessons from recent history about what not to do (both from within Africa and beyond). It would be dangerous, for example, to ignore or discount the role and impact of strong ethnic loyalties. For many societies, the tribe offers acceptance, socio-economic safety and security, and a sense of belonging. These are vital for any society, but most particularly for people who have experienced the trauma and dislocation of violent conflict. Ethnic groups are often also connected to particular geographic locations and ways of life. People feel connected, "rooted" to a particular place. I met with a group of returnees to a region south of Juba, close to the Ugandan border. They spoke of their concerns with regard to one particular ethnic group, saying that the government had resettled members of this other group "on our land". One man who had returned from exile told me:

Before repatriation, the information we were given was, "come back home; there is peace." So we came back, assuming this was true from what was told to us. But we found it was not so. We found others here. We were told we had to look for another place; we were told we have no place in our own home. We have no voice. Our original home has been taken by IDPs [internally displaced persons]. We have nowhere else to go.

I asked why the different ethnic groups resettled here could not share the land and develop peaceful ways to live together. I heard that, for those finally able to return to land they had been forced to flee (land which has been held by their community before anyone could remember), this is yet one more forced displacement. To an outsider, their attitude might seem discriminatory and exclusionary. After all, both communities were forced to flee; both are looking to return home to South Sudan. However, they perceived it as yet another decision imposed upon them without consultation or due consideration for differences in culture, livelihood and language.

Some of the people who remained during the war years harbour resentment toward those returning from exile even though, when pressed on it, they can relate to the need to seek refuge from war. Some South Sudanese in the diaspora in Europe, North America and Australia are eager to return to South Sudan and contribute their skills in development. The international community needs to facilitate their return, and the RSS government should put mechanisms in place and prepare local communities to receive them.

In order to try and resolve problems before they erupt into violent conflicts, the churches have come together to create peace committees made up of local people trained in what they call people-to-people peace building. Some of the peace committees I met with said that, in addition to the issue of tribal tensions, the problem is that there are no roads, hospitals, schools or running water in the home areas from which some re-settled IDPs originally fled. So it is understandable that returnees are reluctant to return to their home communities. The situation results in tension between them and the host communities in which they now live, with many of the latter feeling that they themselves are being forced out of their own homes to make way for "others". The host community has to share or compete for already limited resources with re-settled IDPs and returnees. A real and present danger in the new South Sudan is that community-based conflicts will become the focus. Citizens' attention will be diverted away from the important tasks of monitoring regional and national governments to ensure accountability.

The hard but necessary work that needs to happen now is ... to determine the distribution and allocation of resources, including land and water.

I was told by a variety of people from different sectors, including NGO groups, that these so-called "low-level" conflicts are manipulated by those at the "higher" level. It was implied that those in governance positions may be involved and responsible, if not for instigating the conflicts, then for exacerbating them. The insecurity destabilises communities and retards sustainable development. The lack of basic social services and abuses of human rights increases people's frustrations and anger, intensifying and escalating conflicts. The inter-tribal dynamics are manipulated to turn communities against each other. When communities are displaced because of on-going conflicts, a vacuum of authority is created, allowing for resources to be plundered at will. At the community level in many areas, there is little or no law enforcement. Small arms and light weapons are readily available for use in inter-tribal conflicts and by gangs who exploit people. The insecurity is heightened by attacks on South Sudanese soil from the neighbouring Ugandan rebel group, the Lord's Resistance Army.

The hard but necessary work that needs to happen now is to ensure that all stakeholders are part of decision-making processes to determine the distribution and allocation of resources, including land and water. Peaceful mechanisms to resolve disputes must be put in place to avoid violent conflict. The government of South Sudan must work with communities at the local level to establish community-based systems of governance, and law and order, as well as with neighbouring states to prevent violence from crossing into South Sudan and further destabilising the country. 

Conclusion

While the issues affecting the viability and future of South Sudan are certainly not limited to the ones raised in this article, these are at least among the most crucial requiring immediate and careful attention. Civil society actors play a key role in their just resolution and in creating a just, participatory democracy founded on respect for human rights and the rule of law. The failures and successes from Africa and other regions of the world offer South Sudan a map with which to chart its course ahead. The possibility for an economically viable, peaceful, democratic South Sudan awaits only the wisdom to heed the lessons, and the courage to walk a different path—and perhaps this different path can be what the creation of South Sudan offers Africa and the world in return.

References

African Union. 2011. "The AUHIP Welcomes the Resumption of the Sudan-South Sudan Talks." Press release. Addis Ababa. November 25. http://au.int/en/sites/default/files/AUHIP.Welcomes.Resumption.of_.Sudan_.South_.Sudan_.Talks_.pdf.

South Sudan Civil Society Alliance. 2011. "Communiqué." Juba: First South Sudan Civil Society Convention. July 26–29. http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/544/sudancom.pdf.

Verjee, Aly. 2010. Race Against Time: The Countdown to the Referenda in Southern Sudan and Abyei. Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute. http://www.sudantribune.com/IMG/pdf/Race_Against_Time_-_Aly_Verjee_-_30_Oct_2010-2.pdf.

However, given all that was happening to ethnicity and governance everywhere else in Africa, a focus on that one region seemed too narrow. Sudan was on the verge of a referendum to decide whether or not South Sudan would become a country on its own. The Ivory Coast, once a model of peace and prosperity, was into its tenth year of an ethno-religious war. Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, was from its beginnings troubled by ethnic and religious tensions that made good governance a difficult and infrequent occurrence. Violence in that country continues to increase in intensity and frequency. In 2007, Kenya held a disputed presidential election that led to such unbelievable violence between its two largest ethnic groups that it is still a concern as preparations begin for the next election in December 2012. Even in Libya, the third North African country to experience the "Arab spring," the liberation war against Colonel Gadhafi is said to have a subtext of ethnic tension that may complicate governance in the new country. 

What is the attitude of the African Union (AU) to all of this? Its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), resolutely discouraged changes to colonial borders in the pursuit of ethnic and religious peace and good governance. Will the AU continue this policy or will it be more flexible and encourage such changes as a possibility for which a successful border change in Sudan might be seen as a precedent? The following passage from a press release (February 8, 2011) entitled "The African Union Applauds the Referendum in South Sudan" isn’t entirely clear. 

The Chairperson, recalling the solemn declaration on the Sudan adopted by the AU Summit of January 2011, expresses his conviction that with the completion of this referendum, Sudan has decisively overcome its tragic history of division and its exceptional legacy inherited from its past. In recognition of the Sudan’s unique political circumstances, Africa recognized the right of self-determination for the people of southern Sudan, and supported the free and fair exercise of this right. Indeed, the AU will be keen, at the end of the interim period, on 9 July 2011, to welcome into its ranks the 54th member state of the Union.

There is praise for the events in Sudan; however, the words "exceptional" and "unique" seem to suggest that such a process would not be encouraged elsewhere in Africa. Anyway, we took it upon ourselves to pose some questions about Sudan’s border change as a precedent which other African nations in similar circumstances might follow:

• What are the Republic of South Sudan’s prospects for peace and prosperity?
• Would similar changes in other countries with ethnic and religious differences make things better or worse?

The articles that follow by people with knowledge of the countries and regions involved will address these questions.