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Looking ahead . . .
Vol. 17 - South Africa

Looking back . . .


Vol. 16 (January - June 2015)
GENDER AND GENDER EQUALITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
By the Ezine Editors  To introduce the volume on women’s empowerment, this editorial examines the rise in popularity of international gender rankings over the past twenty years. However, it remains important to recognize that there are vast differences in gender equality and how individuals experience gender across Africa. One’s gender identity and associated gender roles differently influence one’s opportunities and lived experiences. Ultimately, the aim of the volume is to examine the complexities of gender as experienced, constructed, and enforced.
By Leslie Ngwa This paper analyzes Boko Haram’s modus operandi in Nigeria and Cameroon. The author examines the growing trend in Boko Haram’s asymmetrical warmongering that increasingly involves women as a key element in their strategy. Both countries, and the international community must go beyond speechifying and barren activism, and sustain a proactive community-based strategy in dealing with gender-based violence in this war of attrition. Gender-based community action can pave the way for a stronger, women-led resistance in the fight against Boko Haram.


 
What do gender equality scores really tell us?
by the Ezine Editors


According to the 2014 Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI), sub-Saharan Africa has the world’s worst gender discrimination related to women and girls’ access to resources and physical integrity. The OECD Development Centre’s index, which ranks countries based on their social institutions, found that women in sub-Saharan Africa face barriers to access and control of land, property, and financial services. Furthermore, 40 percent of women in the region have been victims of gender-based violence, and legislation on rape and domestic violence is lacking. After reading the results of the SIGI — and many other global gender rankings — one could contend that sub-Saharan Africa is one of the worst places in the world to be a woman. The reality, however, is more complicated.

The rise of gender equality rankings 

As the popularity of international gender rankings has grown over the past two decades (see Table 1 below for the complete listing of indexes discussed here), the headline-making lists have brought gender issues into the spotlight. Yet unreliable data and debate over how gender equality is defined and measured leaves global rankings limited in their ability to capture the complex impacts of gender on the lives of sub-Saharan Africans.

According to The Economist, global performance indicators that rank countries by combining related measures into a single score are “enjoying a boom”. The magazine cites Judith Kelley of Duke University and Beth Simmons of Harvard University, researchers who study the impact of global indicators on policy, as attributing the growth of these global rankings to their use by governments, NGOs, and activists to promote and shape policy change.

Global gender equality indices have similarly grown in number since the first ones were introduced two decades ago. In 1995, tens of thousands of government representatives and activists met in Beijing to discuss gender equality and women’s empowerment. Two weeks of debate led to the introduction of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, which listed 12 critical areas of concern related to education, the girl-child, and violence against women. That year, the UNDP set out to add a gender dimension to its Human Development Report. The result was the Gender Empower Measure (GEM) and the Gender-Related Development Index (GDI), which used data collected by the UNDP to rank countries in annual reports. The GEM used the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments, the percentage of women in economic decision-making positions, and power over economic resources based on earned income to measure “whether women and men are able to actively participate in economic and political life and take part in decision-making” (United Nations Development Programme, 1995). The GDI on the other hand, is designed to measure gender gaps in life expectancy, education, and incomes. 

Though the indices were pioneering at the time, the 1995 Human Development Report acknowledged that the indices lacked other gender equality and empowerment indicators. The report attributed the indices’ shortcomings to the lack of internationally comparable data. Still, the indices have been criticized for measuring inequalities only among the elite and ignoring qualitative aspects of gender issues.

Since then, many other gender equality indices have emerged, each taking related but unique approaches to how gender equality, empowerment, and discrimination is measured. As gender rankings became more elaborate and introduced more indicators into the measurements, fewer countries could be included — African countries in particular were often left out. In 2004, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa introduced the first continent-specific international gender ranking: the African Gender Development Index (AGDI). The index aimed to “better reflect the realities of women and men on the African continent, so as to assess the gender gap in each African country and to help governments improve their performance on gender equality and equity” (Economic Commission for Africa, 2011). To do this, the AGDI measured women’s rights and gender equality based on the level of implementation of key international documents. Though the 2004 pilot index only assessed 12 African countries, the 2011 AGDI expanded to include an additional 18 African countries.

In 2010, after 15 years of criticism, the UNDP introduced yet another global gender ranking, with the aim of remedying the shortcomings of the GEM and GDI. The Gender Inequality Index, published annually, combines and expands upon the categories used in the GEM and GDI: reproductive health, measured by maternal mortality ratio and adolescent birth rates; empowerment, measured by the proportion of parliamentary seats occupied by females and the proportion of adult females and males aged 25 and old with some secondary education; and labour market participation, measured by the labour force participation rate of females versus males 15 and over. The UNDP’s new index intends to “measures the human development costs of gender inequality” in more than 150 countries (UNDP, n.d.). 

In 2013, Europe followed Africa’s lead by introducing its first region-specific gender ranking. The European Institute for Gender Equality’s Gender Equality Index, targeted to EU member states, purports to take into consideration the criticisms of older gender indices by including indicators related to, for example, leisure time and unpaid work. The index, which will be updated every two years, measures indicators in six domains: work, money, knowledge, time power, and health. Notably, the index includes what is calls “satellite domains” that are separate from a country’s overall score. These are intended to allow for the measurement of specific phenomena. The two in its first report were intersecting inequalities and violence.

Accounting for differences between rankings

Yet even the subtle differences in what indicators are included and what are left out can lead to vast differences in the overall rankings. Take, for example, the central African country Rwanda. The 2014 SIGI gives Rwanda a medium score for discrimination in social institutions, one of 13 sub-Saharan countries to receive the score. As the 2014 SIGI included 39 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, this score put Rwanda above average in the region, but not among the top performers: South Africa, Lesotho, Madagascar, and Namibia. Compare this to the 2014 Global Gender Gap Report, published by the World Economic Forum, in which Rwanda debuted at a remarkable seventh place, beating out countries like New Zealand, Germany, and Canada. South Africa, by contrast, came in at 18. Why was there such a big difference between the rankings? 

The contrast mostly comes down to which data were used as indicators of gender equality and how they were weighted. In the SIGI, Rwanda did worst in the category of access to resources and assets. The SIGI found that despite legal rights to land and property, negative attitudes towards women’s land rights meant that women still face difficulties accessing land. Similarly, though there are no legal restrictions to Rwandan women accessing credit, in reality that access is limited. Rwanda’s success, on the other hand, in the Global Gender Gap Report is primarily due to the political empowerment indicators. Rwanda ranks first in the world for the percentage of women in parliament and also does well for the percentage of ministerial positions that women currently hold. Access to land, property and resources, however, is not counted in the Global Gender Gap Report. In the SIGI, the percentage of women in parliament is included under the Restricted Civil Liberties category, one of five equally weighted categories, and thus carries far less influence than it does in the Global Gender Gap Report, which has only four equally weighted categories.

It’s important to note that the intentions of the two indices differ, which affects what they count. Though both indices include a combination of quantitative and qualitative measures, the Global Gender Gap Report intends to highlight the gender-related gaps — rather than overall levels — in access to resources and opportunities with regards to outcomes. The SIGI, on the other hand, focuses on that gap as it relates to policies, attitudes, and practices. 

What is included in and excluded from gender equality indices comes down to subjective judgements, which can substantially sway the results. Once a methodology is established, any changes related to new data, additional countries, or an evolved understanding of gender issues are difficult to incorporate as doing so inevitably affects the ability to make comparisons over time.

The value of global rankings

Rankings are useful. What is measured is made visible and affects what is prioritized and funded.  The data collected can be used to stimulate discussion, hold political leaders and institutions accountable to their commitments, and raise awareness around key issues, thereby helping advocacy efforts.

But rankings also have their flaws. BRIDGE, a UK-based gender and development research organization, points out that, “…while measuring change is often considered to be a technical exercise, it is also a political process.” (Demetriades, n.d.). The Economist adds, “…choosing what to include means pinning down slippery concepts and making subjective judgments”. Multi-faceted and complex concepts such as gender equality and empowerment are inherently simplified in the process of deciding how they will be measured.

The process is complicated by the fact that the data often simply don’t exist, making more complex understandings of gender impossible to measure. The data, which often come from local governments and institutions, may not reflect the experiences of marginalized women and gender minorities who are often simply not counted. The data that do exist differ greatly in quality and are inconsistent, which can make comparisons difficult. 

The need for better data was emphasized by United Nations Secretary-General’s Independent Expert Advisory Group on a Data Revolution for Sustainable Development’s report released in November 2014. The report, which aims to inform the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals that will replace the Millennium Development Goals, noted that “[g]ender inequality and the undervaluing of women’s activities and priorities in every sphere has been replicated in the statistical record”.  The absence of gender-based violence, for example, is a common criticism of many existing gender indices, and yet only about half of all countries report data on intimate partner violence. Further, data is rarely collected from women over 49, and there are little data available on the distribution of money or the division of labour within households, as well as the economic roles of women (IEAG, 2014). 

“There is an urgent need to improve statistical systems to ensure the full mainstreaming of gender into data production, analysis and dissemination and increase the availability of gender statistics for national and international monitoring,” said Stefan Schweinfest, Director of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs’s Statistics Division, at a Gender Statistics Workshop in August 2014. This means avoiding gender bias in the collection of data and collecting data that specifically address issues that may affect some gendered parts of the population more than others.

In an article published by the International Women’s Development Agency, Eleanor Boydell criticized the UN report and its proposals for not going far enough. A World that Counts, she writes, does not specifically call for data to be collected on individuals rather than households. “While the report speaks broadly about the importance of forms of data that provide information about all demographic groups and allow for disaggregation, its consideration of the gendered implications of areas and methods of data collection is limited,” Boydell wrote. John Hendra and Eduardo Sojo argue in a November 4, 2014 post on Devex that non-monetary forms of deprivation must also be measured. 

The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs’ statistical division is one of the organizations trying to improve the data. Recently, gender statistics experts identified 52 quantitative indicators, based on the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, and 11 qualitative indicators of gender equality to guide the production and compilation of gender statistics in the future. As well, the UN’s A World that Counts report named disaggregated data as a key principle for a data revolution in sustainable development. Data disaggregated by sex, age, ability, sexual orientation, gender identity, etc., could be broken down and analyzed in complex ways, providing a far more comprehensive picture of gender equality and empowerment around the world. 

International gender equality rankings, then, represent the evolution of the international development community’s understanding of gender and gender equality. They are both an attempt to reflect the different realities experienced by people around the world and a statement of a shared ideal of what gender equality should look like. As data become more nuanced, so will the rankings — and vice versa. Yet, while rankings serve the purpose of mainstreaming gender as it is understood by international organizations, they will never provide more than a fragment of the reality in any given country or region.
  
The aim of this volume

This is where the AfricaFiles’ Ezine volume on Gender and Gender Equality in Sub-Saharan Africa comes in. The aim of this volume is to draw attention to some of the region’s gender issues not visible in global rankings. As we have just five article to do this, we have selected articles that examine issues from new angles, generate discussion, and explore lesser known case studies. 

We will begin with an analysis of how Boko Haram, a Nigerian-based terrorist group, uses women and girls as a key element of its terror strategy. Next, we will share an exploration into women’s contributions to the 1950s Mau Mau anti-colonial movement in Kenya and their role in shaping collective memory of the movement. Our fourth article will look at the insecurities faced by female street vendors in Kenya. We will complete the volume with a story from an anthropologist in South Africa about her students’ reflections on gender bias in anti-apartheid activist Steve Biko’s writings.

We recognize that there are vast differences in gender equality and how individuals experience gender across Africa. One’s gender identity and associated gender roles differently influence one’s opportunities and lived experiences. Ultimately, the aim of the volume is to examine the complexities of gender as experienced, constructed, and enforced. We hope you enjoy AfricaFiles’ first — and long-overdue — volume dedicated to gender.

Table 1 - Discussed indexes
Name of Index - By - Year launched Categories measured
Social Instiutions Gender Index (SIGI)
OECD
2009
  • Discriminatory family code
  • Restricted physical integrity 
  • Restricted civil liberties 
  • Son bias 
  • Restricted resources and assets
Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)
UNDP
1995
  • Seats in parliament held by women Female legislators, senior officials and managers 
  • Female professional and technical workers 
  • Ratio of estimated female to male earned income
Gender-Related Development Index (GDI)
UNDP
1995
  • Life expectancy at birth
  • Adult literacy rate 
  • Combined gross enrollment ration for primary, secondary and tertiary education 
  • Estimated earned income
African Gender Development Index (AGDI)
UNECA
2004
Gender status index: 
  • Social power ‘Capabilities' 
  • Economic Power ‘Opportunities’
  • Political power ‘Agency’ 
African Women’s Progress Scoreboard: 
  • Women’s rights 
  • Social 
  • Economic 
  • Political
Gender Inequality Index
UNDP
2010
  • Reproductive health 
  • Empowerment 
  • Labour market participation
Gender Equality Index
European Institute for Gender Equality
2013
  • Work 
  • Money 
  • Knowledge 
  • Time 
  • Power 
  • Health 
  • Intersecting inequalities




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Shifting Roles: Girls and Women in Boko Haram’s Strategic Terrorism
by Leslie Ngwa

Introduction

“These terrorists slaughter our boys and abduct our girls to force them into slavery … people should be made aware of the importance of being in a state of preparedness and make sure they acquire what they need to protect themselves…” Mohammad Sanusi, Emir of Kano (who until earlier last year was also Governor of Nigeria’s Central Bank) In the wee hours of 15 November, 2014 Boko Haram fighters took advantage of a fall in water levels on the river separating Cameroon from Nigeria in the Makary district in northern Cameroon and seized two teenage girls leaving their parents in tears. Local tabloid L’Oeil du Sahel recently stated that these girls have not been seen since. On 4 April, 2014 Canadian missionary Sister Gilberte Bussiere was taken hostage in Tchere in the Far North region of Cameroon. She was maltreated and later freed after a ransom had allegedly been paid (Cameroon Tribune, 2 June 2014). During a prayer meeting on Friday 14 November, 2014, the Emir of Kano, Mohammad Sanusi urged populations affected by Boko Haram’s activities to “acquire what they need” to protect themselves. Even though this was generally understood to refer to a call to arms, we could extend the call for reasons of analysis to involve a socio-political reawakening that would better prepare communities to deal with the terrorist activities of Boko Haram. These incidents, including the kidnapping of over 200 Chibok girls and numerous other unreported attacks on women, clearly show that women are unique and strategic victims in Boko Haram’s transnational terrorist activities.

The situation has become even more dicey with the unleashing of what BBC reports described in August 2014 as the a new weapon of war – the female suicide bomber; fuelling concerns that Boko Haram’s insurgency has entered a more ruthless phase. Four of these female suicide bombers – all teenage girls, carried out attacks in Nigeria’s biggest northern city, Kano, last year and prompted many to speculate that Boko Haram had turned some of the over 200 abducted school girls abducted in Chibok in April 2014 into human bombs. Early last month, Boko Haram carried out a major attack in Nigeria’s Borno State. This attack has been described by Amnesty International as the deadliest attack in the history of Boko Haram. Nigerian authorities claimed just 150 people lost their lives, but other sources put the figures at 2000 deaths. According to Jeune Afrique (No. 2819) UNHCR recorded 11,300 refugees arriving Chad from affected areas. Last month, a suspected female suicide bomber, Rokayatou Moussa was arrested in Dimako, a locality in Cameroon’s Eastern Region (Sama, 2015). If we add these realities to last year’s arrests in Katsina State of two girls aged 10 and 18 with explosive belts, France 24’s 12 December 2014 reports of the arrest of a 13-year-old girl with a suicide belt in the same region, the 10 January, 2015 attack in Maiduguri where a ten year-old girl detonated an explosive device tied to her body possibly by leading Boko Haram operatives (BBC/CNN/France 24 TV Reports), and the recent attack in Nigeria’s north-eastern city of Gombe by a middle-aged suicide bomber who detonated explosives killing herself and one soldier at a security checkpoint (Ola, 2014), it becomes very clear that female bodies have become not only battlefields but weapons in Boko Haram’s terror strategy. The presence of female suicide bombers is therefore a potent and deadly grand strategy that has led to the death of at hundreds of Nigerians and Cameroonians (going by Associated Press reports). There is therefore a pressing need for counter action at community, national, and international levels given that the impact of Boko Haram’s activities is multi-dimensional and has the potential of not only ensuring long-term destabilization of the region, but also geographically expanding the theatre of their terrorist activities.

Critical Issues

Boko Haram’s use of women as victims and perpetrators of terror has rocked the foundations of regional geopolitical decency. Allegations of weakness and irresoluteness have been levied against the Nigerian government. According to Foreign Policy (December - 2014), Nigeria’s actions aimed at fighting Boko Haram over the last couple of years have been characterized by a gaping lack of the three Cs - continuity, consistency and commitment. The result of these weaknesses has been Boko Haram’s success in creating a semi-permanent reality of their own in the Lake Chad region and its environs. It is therefore, safe to say that Nigerian authorities have botched the war against Boko Haram. Cameroon on the other hand has been arguably more effective in pounding Boko Haram and reducing its capacity to create havoc in its territory. This probably explains why Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau recently declared his intention in a YouTube video to create more havoc in Cameroon, a clear that the counterinsurgency activities of the Cameroon military have actually hurt Boko Haram.  But with women as a new weapon in Boko Haram’s arsenal, anxiety may be the new mood in this region, which is yet to become accustomed to the fact that women have become victimized perpetrators in the spread of terror.

The activities of Boko Haram and especially regional counterinsurgency efforts against Boko Haram have not been sufficiently reported and “securitized”. According to subscribers to the Copenhagen School of securitization theory like Buzan et al (1998), 'security' is a both a speech act and a distinct social construct. It has consequences in the context of the anarchic international system in which we live. By securitizing a threat, stakeholders seek to move it beyond politics into an area of security concerns. The goal generally tends to use the legitimation of resources needed for dealing with the threat – in this case Boko Haram, or more specifically, the use of women in Boko Haram’s terror activities. Boko Haram has arguably not been sufficiently securitized as a transnational threat. When securitization of Boko Haram has been high (through media reports and high-profile speeches/conferences) it has generally been late securitization. Early securitization, that is, setting the agenda on the war against Boko Haram much earlier would have been ideal. Instead, we now find ourselves with what I call “staccato” securitization, which could be understood as intermittent securitization as opposed to sustained securitization. That said, we must recognize that securitization of a threat like Boko Haram is not a solution in itself. It should be seen as a first step that leads to socio-political dialogue, because this threat, like many others, has its roots in the disenfranchisement of young affected young people, and the unwillingness of governments to communicate strategically with local populations. 

Unfortunately, there has been little or no counter-narrative against Boko Haram’s ideological positions. There is a critical need for the framework of public debate to be reshaped in order to accommodate a growing need for ideological warfare against Boko Haram’s incoherent ideological positions. The organization claims it fights against western education, yet it uses the products of western education and western innovation such as western weapons and uniforms in its terrorist activities. It claims to be against western education, but uses computer technology – the fruit of western education and research, to carry out their propaganda activities. Boko Haram has turned the World Wide Web into a world wild web of inhuman propaganda and reduced the internet into a platform for denigrating women and girls. These inconsistencies are glaring.  It is difficult to understand why its ideological positions are not being hit consistently in order to expose their terror-breeding mechanisms. 

The Way Forward

When fighter jets from the UAE took part in airstrikes against the Islamic State in September 2014, they were led by female pilot Major Mariam Al Mansouri (Zraick, 2014). When the Taliban upped their game against girls attending school in Pakistan, they found a powerful response in Malala Yousafzai, a young Pakistani girl who has become an icon in the fight for access to education for every girl. Nigeria and Cameroon need a local Malala in the ideological battle against Boko Haram, and a local Mansouri in the counterinsurgency efforts against this terrorist organization. Part of the problem with fighting the victimization of women in regional transnational terror activities in the region has been the absence of female icons and symbols that convey a counter-narrative through their life stories and courage.

According to figures published by Foreign Policy (December 2014), thirty five percent of Kurdish combatants fighting in Syria are women (approximately 15000 women). When Islamic State fighters swept through Syria and Iraq, Kurdish forces met them on the frontline. Among these forces resisting the advance of the Islamic State fighters were thousands of female combatants including those from the Peshmerga, the armed forces from Iraqi Kurdistan, and Syrian Kurdistan’s People’s Protection Units. Colonel Nahida Ahmed Rashid, a Peshmerga told PBS recently that the armed engagement of women in the fight against the Islamic State is not just to protect Kurdistan, but also to say that there is no difference between men and women. There is an urgent need for women to join the armed struggle against Boko Haram. This will not only be a sign of collective responsibility, but a major victory against those who have used distorted norms of patriarchy to promote gender inequality and demean women. In Cameroon and Nigeria, women need to step up to join the armed struggle in order to show not just that the battle for equality is a battle for the resources generated by society, but also that equality can be evidenced in the sacrifices each gender makes.

The Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau have more in common than just similar first names. They are driven by a desire to spread their chaotic vision and distorted values. Successes and failures in the fight against the Islamic State have seminal value in the fight against Boko Haram. Of course, this does not mean we can cut and paste strategies, but it means that lessons can be learned and implemented. The engagement of women in counterinsurgency efforts is one of those lessons that can be learned from the fight against the Islamic State and implemented in the fight against Boko Haram. 

The increasing agency of non-state actors in warfare and terrorism in Nigeria and Cameroon cannot be addressed without the engagement of local non-state actors like local communities and civil society organizations, especially in rural areas. The Economic Community of Central African States recently trained its first batch of civilian experts at Cameroon’s international war college in Yaoundé. These experts are trained in peace-building and the geo-politics of the sub-region. The recently trained experts are yet to be actively involved in the fight against Boko Haram. Of significant importance is also the fact that less than 10 percent of these experts are female. So while women disproportionately suffer the nefarious consequences of Boko Haram’s terrorism and play a significant role in the perpetration of deadly terrorist activities, the response to gender-based and female-intensive acts of terrorism has not actively involved women in Cameroon and Nigeria. 

We must understand that Western geopolitical interests and local geopolitical interests are not necessarily similar. There are those who argue that sustained egregious action by Boko Haram has met with growing minimalism and retrenchment in U.S. policy; but even the French who have significant military presence in the region have not seen their presence act as a clear deterrence. Therefore, it can be argued that the U.S. and German approach of supporting counterinsurgency efforts through alternative means is potentially more effective. We, as Africans need to take control of our destiny and stop complaining at every single opportunity about what the West is doing or not doing. Western military might and assistance alone will not help counterinsurgency efforts. Endogenous and community-led approaches like the engagement of hunters and vigilante groups in Nigeria has been seen to help (Carayol, 2005 p.30), and should be encouraged and supported. However, these key actors will need better training to fill the gap left by inefficiencies in police and military action within affected communities. 

Conclusion

Understanding the sources of radicalism and extremism is more important than ever before (Esposito, 2002). What we are witnessing with Boko Haram is nothing new and is certainly not an exclusively Muslim-world-inspired affair. The West must adopt a right versus wrong approach in a counter-narrative against Boko Haram, instead of an us-versus-them approach which appears to be the case right now. The reality may be different, but there is a growing perception particularly among Muslim populations that Western media have made the war against terrorism look like a war against Islam and its values. This is why the “jesuisCharlie” protests sparked anger and counter-protests in a number of African countries. This us-versus-them approach to dealing with terrorism is counterproductive. The approach needs to shift into an approach that focuses on condemning terrorism without appearing to create a culture clash. There is a gaping credibility deficit in the eyes of local populations as far as the capacity of stakeholders to ensure security of local populations is concerned, but local women too must step up and play a more active role by undertaking important courageous acts like informing officials about radicalization of their children as soon as possible.
 
Regional leaders need to tap into their common heritage in order to find endogenous soft-power-based approaches for dealing with this collective enemy. Boko Haram has succeeded to institutionalize uncertainty not only in Nigeria, but also in Cameroon and parts of Chad. The organization’s deification of utopian ideologies continues to gain some traction in fragile communities where women have traditionally held roles as second-class citizens. You do not have to be a prophet of doom to fear massive disaster. But the worst can be avoided by actively engaging the female demographic, which makes up the most affected group in this new emerging era of sustained terrorism. As well as first-state counterinsurgency efforts such as taking up arms, women must become actively engaged in waging peace and articulating a counter-narrative. Boko Haram has clearly demonstrated that women’s bodies and minds are not only battlefields on which their terrorist activities can be carried out, but also that they can become strategic arms of choice in the battle against local communities. A proportional response to this strategy must involve an equal measure of female engagement. 

Leslie Ngwa is a Cameroon-based researcher. He holds an MA in International Political Economy from the University of Sheffield (UK). He is founder of the Eric Chinje Center for Media and Peace Studies. Contact: (+237)677-451-919 Email: ngwaleslie@yahoo.com



References

Buzan, Barry et al (1998) Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner

Carayol, R. (2015) “Jusqu’ou ira Boko Haram”, in Jeune Afrique No.2819, January 2015 p.30

Esposito, John (2002) Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam, Oxford University Press

Foreign Policy, A World Disrupted (Nov/Dec 2014 Magazine Edition)

'Girl bomber' kills 19 people in Maiduguri market; http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30761963  (accessed on January 11, 2014)

Ola, Lanre (2014) Female Suicide Bombers Kill at Least 44 in Nigeria’s northeast (www.yahoo.com/suspected-suicide-bombings-rock-maiduguri (accessed on November 26, 2014)

Popovski, Vasselin et al (2009) World Religions and Norms of War, United Nations University Press

Sama, Enerst (2015) “Cameroon Arrest of Female Suicide Bomber in Dimako” in Cameroon Concord, (08 January 2015)

Zraick, Karen (2014) Arab Women Led Airstrikes over Syria, New York Times (September 25, 2014 Edition)



 
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Opinions expressed in the articles appearing in this ezine are those of the writer(s) and not do necessarily reflect the views of the AfricaFiles' editors and network members. They are included in our material as a reflection of a diversity of views and a variety of issues. Material written specifically for AfricaFiles may be edited for length, clarity or inaccuracies.